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TRINITY OF SPECIFIC, 
OBJECTIVE FACTS AMOUNTS 
TO ARTICULABLE CAUSE  
R. v. Coles, 2002 PESCTD 36 
 
A police officer stopped the accused 
after he had followed him drive at a 
 
honestly held belief that an offence had been 
committed at the time he stopped the vehicle) and also 
consider objective criteria. This objective assessment, 
does not however, require the technical assessment of 
the precise parameters that would be undertaken by a 
court in deciding if the driver was guilty or not. In 
other words, “the Crown does not have to prove 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” that the officer’s belief speed well below the speed limit, 
signal well in advance of his turn, and 
proceed through a crosswalk just as 
a pedestrian entered it. As a result of the interaction 
with the driver, the officer formed the opinion he had 
sufficient grounds to make a demand for samples of his 
breath. Subsequent samples provided were in excess of 
the 80mg% limit. At trial, the judge found the 
detention was arbitrary and contrary to s.9 of the 
Charter. As a consequence, the evidence of impairment 
and certificates of analysis were excluded as evidence 
and the accused was acquitted. The Crown appealed to 
the Prince Edward Island Supreme Court arguing the 
judge erred in finding that the accused was arbitrarily 
detained.  
 
Supreme Court Justice Campbell framed the question 
on appeal as “whether there was satisfactory reason 
for the police officer to stop this particular vehicle on 
that night, as opposed to any other vehicle on the 
road”. Such a reason could arise from either a 
“presumed breach of a statutory provision” or from a 
common law articulable cause detention. If neither 
could be justified, then the detention would be 
arbitrary. 
 
Statutory Authority 
 
Unlike other provinces (such as British Columbia and 
Ontario), Prince Edward Island’s motor vehicle 
legislation does not authorize the random stopping of 
motorists. However, s.10(1)(d) of its Highway Traffic 
Act does empower the police to stop drivers where 
they have a reasonable belief the vehicle is being 
operated contrary to the Act. In assessing whether an 
officer has a reasonable belief, the Court must look 
beyond the subjective belief of the officer (he had an 
was “reasonable””. Nor is it necessary to determine 
that the officer was “correct”; it is simply a test to 
determine whether there was an objective foundation 
for the officer’s subjective belief.  
 
In this case, the officer’s attention to the vehicle was 
heightened because it was traveling below the speed 
limit and had prematurely signaled a turn. Although 
neither of these actions themselves were offences in 
the officer’s mind, the officer did have a reasonable 
belief the driver failed to yield to a pedestrian. 
Furthermore, s.10(1)(c) of the Act permits a police 
officer to direct traffic to ensure safety of the 
highway. This would allow the officer to stop the 
accused if he believed the accused’s action was a public 
safety hazard, which was the case. The stopping of the 
accused was therefore not arbitrary, random, or 
without foundation. 
 
Common Law Authority 
 
Under the common law, the police may stop persons 
where they have an articulable cause, which has been 
defined as “a constellation of objectively discernable 
facts which give the detaining officer reasonable cause 
to suspect that the detainee is criminally implicated in 
the activity under investigation1”. In concluding that 
the officer had an articulable cause to stop the 
accused, Campbell J. stated: 
 
There were three specific, objective, discernable facts, 
namely the slow driving, the early signalling, and the 
alleged failure to yield that caused the police officer to 
select the [accused’s] vehicle. It was not a hunch. It was 
not a random stop. There was a rational foundation for 
the detention. It was not a[n] arbitrary detention… 
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1 R. v. Simpson (1993) 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont.C.A.) 
 And further: 
 
I am of the opinion that the three specific and 
articulable observations, when taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, would constitute 
objectively discernible facts and provide reasonable 
grounds to suspect the driver to be impaired. The fact 
that, subjectively, the officer did not connect the three 
observations and suspect impairment does not preclude 
finding, on an objective analysis, that there were grounds 
to suspect impairment, and therefore, grounds to stop 
the [accused]. 
 
As a result, the Crown’s appeal was allowed and a new 
trial was ordered. 
 
SEIZURE OF DETAINEE’s 
CLOTHING 12 HOURS AFTER 
ARREST REASONABLE 
R. v. Stubinski (No.1), 2002 BCSC 612 
 
Police attended a residence in 
response to a 911 call to find a 
person, who was being treated by 
ambulance attendants outside on the 
sidewalk, alleging she was assaulted by the accused who 
was apparently inside the home. Several people were 
living in the residence, including the accused and the 
complainant who slept on a mattress lying on the dining 
room floor. They also shared a bathroom with three 
other residents of the house.  Police knocked on the 
door and were told the accused was asleep on the 
mattress. The police woke up the accused, confirmed 
his identity, and requested he come outside. The 
accused was subsequently arrested for assault at 10:20 
pm, handcuffed, and transported to the police 
detachment. The complainant was further interviewed 
at the police office and told police she had been 
sexually assaulted. The following morning, at about 
9:00 am, the police re-attended the home and 
interviewed one of the other residents of the house in 
the police car. He reluctantly told police he had seen a 
toilet bowl plunger being used in the assault.  After the 
interview, the officer followed the resident back into 
the house and asked where the plunger was. The 
resident stated he did not know, but the officer 
continued to follow him into a bathroom on the main 
floor where he pointed out the plunger. The officer 
noted a reddish stain on the handle of the plunger, 
which was thought may be blood. Without a warrant, 
the officer seized the plunger.  
 
The officer then returned to the police office at 10:30 
am where he asked the accused, who was being 
photographed in the identification section, to remove 
his shorts. The officer, again without a warrant, seized 
the shorts. The accused challenged the admissibility of 
the plunger, the DNA evidence derived from it and the 
shorts, arguing that the warrantless search and 
seizures were unreasonable and violated s. 8 of the 
Charter. The Crown countered that the search and 
seizures, although warrantless, were nonetheless 
reasonable as an incident to lawful arrest. 
 
The Plunger 
 
For a search and/or seizure to be reasonable as an 
incident to arrest, the search must be truly incidental 
or connected to the arrest. Although the officer had a 
proper purpose in searching the bathroom, to discover 
evidence, the search did not flow from the arrest the 
preceding evening. At or about the time of the arrest, 
the police had no intention of searching the residence 
and “no effort was made to secure the residence when 
the police left it despite the fact other people lived in 
the house”. It was not the arrest of the accused that 
caused the police to search the bathroom, but the 
information received the following day from the other 
resident of the house. In short, the search for and 
seizure of the plunger was unreasonable because it 
flowed from witness information received about eleven 
hours after the arrest, not from the arrest itself, and 
therefore could not be justified as an incident to 
lawful arrest. The plunger and any derivative DNA 
evidence resulting from its examination was ruled 
inadmissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter. 
 
The Shorts 
 
Although the shorts were seized almost twelve hours 
after the arrest, their seizure was incidental to the 
arrest. Justice Tysoe opined, at para. 31: 
 
[The accused] was in the custody of the police from the 
time of his arrest to the time of the seizure and he was 
still being processed at the RCMP Detachment when the 
shorts were seized.  Although there was a longer period 
of time between the arrest and the seizure of the shorts 
than there was between the arrest and the seizure of 
the plunger, the normal dealings by the police with an 
accused person following arrest had not yet come to an 
end when the shorts were seized and the seizure formed 
part of the arrest process.  I rule that the seizure of 
the shorts did not violate s. 8 of the Charter. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
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 REMOVING LUGGAGE FROM 
CONVEYOR BELT 
UNREASONABLE 
R. v. Truong, 2002 BCCA 315 
 
The accused and a traveling 
companion, who were at an airport’s 
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apparently as a matter of routine, at the Vancouver 
International Airport takes place without the consent of 
the travelling public.  I do not accept that by checking 
their luggage for domestic flights passengers surrender 
control of it for all purposes.  (emphasis added) 
 
In this case, the police were acting only on a suspicion 
and did not have the authority to take the bag from 
the conveyor belt and remove it from the control of 
V
Jdeparture level awaiting a domestic 
flight out, attracted the suspicion 
of the police. Their behaviour and 
uggage type fit the profile of a drug courier. The 
fficer who watched them check in contacted other 
fficers who were located in an area to which their 
aggage would be sent along a conveyor belt. The 
ccused’s bag was removed from the conveyor belt and 
et on the ground so that a police dog could sniff the 
ag. The dog indicated on the bag and the officers 
ould also smell the odour of bleach, often used to 
ask the smell of marihuana. The accused was arrested 
nd the bag was opened. In the bag police found 52 
ounds of marihuana. At trial, the judge held that 
here was no violation of the accused’s s. 8 Charter 
ight and convicted the accused. The accused appealed, 
rguing that the police had no lawful authority to take 
ontrol of the bag by removing it from the conveyor 
elt and place it on the ground. This, it was suggested, 
as a breach of s. 8 and the resultant evidence should 
e inadmissible. The constitutionality of the dog sniff 
as not argued. 
he majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
2:1) held that although the police were acting to 
ntercept contraband at the airport, at the time the 
ag was removed from the conveyor “the police were 
cting on a suspicion” and “had no reasonable…grounds 
o believe that the [accused] had committed an 
ffence”. Passengers who check their luggage for 
omestic flights do not expect that the police will 
andle it for general investigative purposes. They 
ntrust their luggage to the airline for safe transport 
o the intended destination and only properly 
onducted searches for security are authorized under 
tatute (Aeronautics Act, Air Carrier Security 
egulations). However, this statutory power to search 
or air safety does not eliminate the right against 
ntrusions for criminal investigation purposes. Donald J. 
tated: 
I think most passengers would feel their privacy was 
invaded if at the check-in booth the police took away their 
luggage to be sniffed by a police dog.  What occurs unseen, 
the airline. The seizure was conducted without a 
warrant and was therefore unreasonable. However, the 
investigatory seizure was minor and the evidence was 
admissible under s. 24(2).  
 
Although agreeing with the majority that the evidence 
should be admissible, Newbury J. disagreed with the 
majority on the analysis of the accused’s privacy 
interest in his luggage: 
 
In my view, it would be slicing the cheese too fine to find 
that a person checking in for a flight at Vancouver 
International Airport would expect that his or her 
luggage would be searched for purposes of air safety, but 
would nevertheless have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy for other purposes.  One either has a reduced 
expectation of privacy or one does not.  Airports are 
obvious conduits for the smuggling of everything from 
banned seeds and plant materials to currency to illegal 
narcotics.  To suggest that when one travels by air one 
has a lower expectation of privacy because of security 
issues but not because of issues of smuggling and illegal 
activity, is simply to ignore modern realities. 
 
Newbury J. also noted that if a person can be briefly 
detained for investigative purposes on a standard of 
articulable cause, a similar standard to move the bag 
off the conveyor belt to permit a police dog to sniff it 
would also be arguably justified where “objectively 
discernable” facts exist. The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
 
“The Charter right to silence comes into play when a 
person is caught within the state’s control. Underlying 
that right is the principle that a person who is detained 
by state authority has the continuing right to decide 
whether to make a statement to persons in authority, 
provide evidence against himself, or remain silent. A 
person who is not within the state’s control does not 
need protection from the state’s coercive power” 2 
BCCA Justice Huddart          
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2 R. v. M.C.W. 2002 BCCA 341 
 EXPLANATIONS OFFERED IN 
COURT IRRELEVANT TO 
FORMING OF OPINION 
R. v. Harder, 2002 SKQB 216 
 
A police officer observed the 
accused’s vehicle weaving within its 
lane and barely cross a centre and 
shoulder line on four occasions as it 
ascended a hill. The officer 
activated his lights and the accused promptly came to a 
stop. He immediately and without difficulty produced 
his licence and registration to the officer. The officer 
detected an odour of alcohol coming from the accused 
at the time he was seated in his vehicle. Further, the 
accused admitted to having consumed alcohol, appeared 
docile or perhaps tired, and did not appear to be acting 
in a “completely normal manner”. The officer demanded 
the accused provide a sample of his breath. Later, 
when the officer asked the accused to be seated in the 
police car and breath in his direction, the officer 
detected an extremely strong odour of liquor.  The 
accused was convicted at trial of driving with a blood 
alcohol level in excess of 80mg% but appealed to the 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench arguing that the 
taking of the samples violated his right to be secure 
against unreasonable search and seizure and should be 
excluded as evidence because the officer did not have 
the necessary reasonable and probable grounds to 
demand them.  
 
The test for determining the existence or absence of 
reasonable and probable grounds to make a demand was 
summarized by Kovach J. as follows: 
 
The Criminal Code requires that an arresting officer must 
subjectively have reasonable and probable grounds on 
which to base a demand. Those grounds must, in addition, 
be justifiable from an objective point of view. That is to 
say, a reasonable person placed in the position of the 
officer must be able to conclude that there were indeed 
reasonable and probable grounds for the demand. On the 
other hand, the officer need not demonstrate anything 
more than reasonable and probable grounds. Specifically, 
the officer is not required to establish a prima facie case 
of impaired driving before making a demand. 
 
In assessing whether the officer had reasonable and 
probable grounds to make the demand, the trial judge 
erroneously considered the strong odour of liquor 
detected on the accused’s breath after the demand 
was made. Post demand observations cannot be 
considered when reviewing the presence or absence of 
reasonable and probable grounds. However, the 
difference between the odour detected at the window 
and the extremely strong odour detected after the 
demand was insufficient to remove the objective 
justification for the demand. Even though the trial 
judge erred in considering the post demand 
observations, the remaining grounds relied upon were 
justifiable from an objective point of view. The results 
of the breath tests were admissible as evidence.  
 
The accused also testified during the trial voir dire 
explaining away many of the officer’s observations 
concerning his appearance and driving which were 
consistent with sobriety. On this issue, Kovach J. 
concluded: 
 
[T]he explanations provided in testimony had not been 
proffered to the constable at any time, either prior or 
subsequent to the demand. Had the explanations been 
proffered, the constable would have been required to 
consider them, together with all other information 
available to him, prior to formulating his opinion.  
 
The Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench refused to 
interfere with the trial judge’s verdict, the accused’s 
appeal was dismissed, and the conviction was upheld. 
 
Complete case available at www.lawsociety.sk.ca 
 
59-MINUTE DELAY  
BETWEEN ARREST & BREATH 
DEMAND PROPER 
R. v. Squires, 
(2002) Docket: C37147 (OntCA) 
 
A police officer responded to a 
report of a rollover accident and 
found the accused lying on his back 
in a ditch about 15 metres from the 
overturned crushed car. As the 
accused attempted to sit up, the officer was concerned 
about possible injuries and convinced the accused to lie 
down. The officer immediately noted blood on the 
accused’s face and a smell of an alcoholic beverage as 
the accused mumbled “gibberish”. The officer formed 
the opinion that the accused was the driver of the 
vehicle and arrested him for impaired driving at 1:03 
am. Ambulance and fire personnel arrived and the 
accused was transported to the hospital arriving at 
1:35 am. At 1:56 am the attending physician advised 
the officer that he could speak to the accused. The 
Volume 2 Issue 7 
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 officer then read the accused his right to counsel in 
relation to the impaired driving (which he indicated he 
understood and declined to contact a lawyer) and the 
official warning followed by the breathalyzer demand 
at 2:02 am (59 minutes after the arrest). The accused 
was presented to a qualified breathalyzer technician 
and after three attempts failed to provide a sample.  
 
At trial, the accused was acquitted of impaired driving, 
dangerous driving, and refusing to provide a breath 
sample because the judge was not satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused was the driver of 
the vehicle. Despite the officer having reasonable and 
probable grounds, the accused was under no legal 
obligation to take the breath test because there was 
insufficient evidence to support he was the driver. The 
Crown successfully appealed to the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice. Frate J. held that the trial judge 
erred in concluding that once he formed a reasonable 
doubt whether the accused was driving, the accused 
was no longer obligated to provide a sample. 
Furthermore, even though the demand occurred 59 
minutes after the arrest, it was nonetheless made as 
soon as practicable under the circumstances. The case 
was sent back to the trial judge to enter a conviction 
with respect to the refusal to provide a breath sample 
and sentence the accused. The accused further 
appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal arguing that 
the Superior Court Justice erred in concluding that 
the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to 
arrest the accused for impaired driving and that the 
demand was made as soon as practicable. 
 
Reasonable and Probable Grounds 
 
“Reasonable and probable grounds” under s.254(3) of 
the Criminal Code requires a subjective belief by the 
officer that must be objectively justified. Here, the 
police relied upon an odour of alcohol, glassy eyes, 
slurred speech, and disorientation in addition to the 
fact there was a crushed car involved in a single vehicle 
accident with an injured man lying in a ditch 15 metres 
from the car approximately one minute after the 
accident; all which occurred on a clear night in a quiet 
rural community. Doherty J. for the unanimous Court of 
Appeal held that any reasonable person would reach 
the conclusion that the officer had reasonable and 
probable grounds to arrest the accused for impaired 
driving. 
 
As Soon as Practicable 
 
Section 254(3) of the Code requires that the demand 
for breath samples be made “forthwith or as soon as 
practicable” after the police have formed their opinion 
that reasonable and probable grounds exist. Although 
the demand was not made “forthwith” (it was made 59 
minutes after arrest) it was made “as soon as 
practicable” (which has been synonymously interpreted 
to mean “within a reasonably prompt time” and not “as 
soon as possible”). The officer acted professionally and 
humanely when he postponed the additional legal steps 
following the arrest in the interest of the accused’s 
health. Furthermore, the officer acted in accordance 
with the legal requirement that the demand and 
Charter warnings be given “once an accused is able to 
understand the questions and respond to them in a 
meaningful way”. The demand was lawful and the appeal 
was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
USE OF 37mm GAS GUN 
NEGLIGENT: POLICE PARTIALLY 
LIABLE FOR DAMAGES 
McLean v. Seisel et al.,  
(2002) Docket:98-CV-159410 (OntSCJ) 
 
The plaintiff sued the police as a 
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when she was rendered legally blind 
in her left eye after police 
discharged tear gas from a 37 mm gas gun in an effort 
to apprehend her. Members of the plaintiff’s family 
also made claims under Ontario’s Family Law Act for 
loss of guidance, care, and companionship. The 33-year-
old plaintiff, who was diagnosed with a schizoaffective 
disorder, suffered periodic episodes of psychotic 
behaviour lasting a few days because she refused to 
comply with a drug regimen. Incidents included 
wandering in the street, wandering into another 
person’s residence, talking to herself, rambling 
incoherently, lunging at a police officer with a knife, 
setting fire to her apartment, attempting suicide, and 
assaulting a 12 year old girl. Inevitably, the police 
would be called, she would be apprehended under the 
Mental Health Act, taken to a psychiatric facility for 
treatment, and released after being treated with 
sedatives and psychotic drugs.  
 
5
 The plaintiff’s mother, sensing her daughter was 
heading for a relapse, called the police to apprehend 
her before she deteriorated. The police attended, but 
left after determining she was fine. Later that evening 
the police re-attended after receiving a complaint that 
the plaintiff threatened a neighbour and her children. 
Police observed swastikas written with red lipstick on 
the plaintiff’s windows, a cross and “666” written in 
red lipstick on her door, and fresh white paint on the 
door handle. After knocking on the door and 
attempting to communicate without success, the 
attending officer attempted to open the door but 
found it had been barricaded with furniture. Opening 
the door slightly, the officer introduced pepper spray 
into the apartment hoping the plaintiff would exit as a 
result. The plaintiff responded by throwing objects at 
and through the door.  
 
The officer contacted the Emergency Task Force 
(ETF) for assistance and eight ETF officers attended. 
The officers entered the apartment and discharged a 
37 mm (muzzle blast) gas gun. The plaintiff ran into the 
bathroom and locked herself in. A second muzzle blast 
was discharged 5 minutes later, from outside the 
apartment, through the bathroom window within less 
than 3 feet of the plaintiff’s face as the plaintiff was 
seated on the toilet. At this time other ETF members 
entered the bathroom and took the plaintiff into 
custody. It was this second discharge that left the 
plaintiff legally blind in her left eye.  
 
In assessing whether the police were negligent, Dyson 
J. of Ontario’s Superior Court of Justice posed the 
following questions: 
 
• Did the police act reasonably under the 
circumstances? 
• Did they know or ought they to have known that 
acting as they did would result in serious injury to 
the plaintiff? 
• Were less lethal approaches to the apprehension 
of the plaintiff obvious and available? 
 
Prior to the second discharge of the gas gun, an officer 
could hear the plaintiff talking unintelligibly to herself. 
She was contained in a very small room, did not pose a 
physical threat to the police or herself and at no time 
did anyone observe her with a knife in her hand. 
Furthermore Dyson J. found other less lethal options 
“such as merely making loud vocal noises, putting one’s 
face which is covered with a gas mask into the window, 
prodding the plaintiff with a baton, or the use of 
“pepper spray” were not used. A firearms and tactics 
instructor testifying for the plaintiff provided an 
opinion that the muzzle blast was “dangerous and 
inappropriate” because there was no real safety 
problem for the heavily protected ETF officers with 
the 120 lb plaintiff seated on the toilet talking to 
herself. The officers could have simply burst through 
the door and arrested the plaintiff who would not have 
been able to react in time to pose a danger. Another 
plaintiff witness, an ex-police officer and former ETF 
leader testified the police failed to adequately 
negotiate with the plaintiff. Furthermore, the police 
failed to comply with their own procedure manual which 
endorses the use of tear gas “when all options have 
been totally exhausted and negotiations have 
completely broken down or if other circumstances 
dictate…”. 
 
In recognizing that the police perform “an unenviable 
but necessary service for the protection and safety of 
the community and the emotionally disturbed person 
involved”, the Court concluded that the police were 
partially responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries:  
 
[T]he firing of the second muzzle blast into the 
bathroom was unreasonable, unnecessary, excessive and 
constitutes negligence on the part of the police. I find 
the police negligent in using the muzzle blast weapon 
when less lethal means were available. Further, I find 
that the police knew or ought to have known that by 
firing the muzzle blast at such close range serious 
personal injury was probable. Also, I find that the police 
were negligent in failing to follow the prescribed 
procedure outlined in their own manual with respect to 
mediation.  
 
Having found the police negligent, Dyson J. also found 
the plaintiff 50% at fault because it was through her 
conscious decision to discontinue drug therapy that 
precipitated the behaviour which lead to the police 
intervention and the resulting incident. The plaintiff 
was awarded $56,500 in damages for pain and 
suffering, permanent physical injury, loss of sight, 
disfigurement, and psychological trauma. The plaintiff’s 
mother received $5,000, the plaintiff’s sister received 
$2,000, and the plaintiff’s daughter received $4,000 
for loss of guidance, care, and companionship.  
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“You can easily judge the character of a man by how he 
treats those who can do nothing for him” Goethe, 
18th/19th century German poet, novelist, playwright, and 
philosopher 
Volume 2 Issue 7 
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 SUSPECT NOT DETAINED: 
UNDERCOVER POLICE TRICK 
ACCEPTABLE 
R. v. Cooper, 2002 ABCA 141 
 
The accused, who was convicted of 
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the “murder” of his wife 21 years ago. The applicant 
sought review of the decision in the Provincial Court of 
British Columbia arguing that the firearms officer had 
erred. The test on review to the Court was not 
whether the judge would or would not grant a licence, 
but whether the officer had reasonable grounds for 
not granting it. Although the officer improperly used 
the word “murder” (he should have used the word 
V
Jmurdering two children he was 
babysitting, appealed his convictions 
arguing he was denied his right to 
silence under s. 7 of the Charter 
nd further, that the investigative methods used by 
he police were so oppressive his statement was not 
oluntary. Following the accused’s arrest, he refused to 
ake a statement while he was in custody. An 
ndercover officer was placed in a holding area with 
he accused and offered him a place to go after he was 
eleased. Although the accused could have stayed at 
ther places in town, he chose to go with the 
ndercover officer and his partner to an apartment 
ollowing his release. The undercover officer offered 
he accused a couple of “weak” alcoholic beverages and 
as questioned repeatedly about the incident. Although 
e initially stated he did not want to talk about it, the 
ccused eventually made an inculpatory statement.  
he right to silence protected under s. 7 of the 
harter prevents the police from denying a person, 
nder their control during the criminal process, the 
hoice of whether to speak or not. This may include the 
se of tricks. In this case, the accused was not 
etained, either physically or psychologically, which 
ould have rendered him under police power.  
he common law confessions rule requires that 
tatements made to persons in authority must be 
oluntary. However, the accused was not under the 
mpression he was speaking to a person in authority and 
herefore the confessions rule did not apply. The 
ppeal was dismissed. 
omplete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
POSSESSING A FIREARM: A 
PRIVELEGE, NOT A RIGHT 
irearms Act and Reeves, 2002 BCPC 0181 
 
A firearms officer refused an 
application for a firearms licence on 
the basis of the applicant’s “history” 
of violent and criminal behaviour for 
“killing” because the applicant was convicted of 
manslaughter), Smith J. found that the possession of a 
firearm is a privilege, not a right, and the officer acted 
within the scope of his authority and would have been 
wrong to grant the licence based on the applicant’s 
background. The application was denied. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
TIME OF ACCIDENT  
INFERRED FROM FACTS 
R. v Jinks, 2002 BCPC 0176 
 
A police officer attended the scene 
of a single vehicle accident where a 
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ended up overturned in a ditch a 
short distance from a local pub. A 
earby resident attended the accident after hearing 
ires squealing and a loud bang. She found a vehicle 
lipped upside down in a 10 ft. deep ditch with the 
ngine running. She yelled for her son to call 911, and 
ith the help of another motorist, assisted the sole 
ccupant (the accused) from the driver’s door and out 
f the ditch. The accused fell over into some brambles 
nd mud as he tried to get onto the highway from the 
itch. Paramedics attended and the accused initially 
isidentified himself. Following a head-to-toe medical 
xamination, the accused signed a waiver refusing to go 
o the hospital. A police officer soon arrived and spoke 
o the ambulance driver who informed the officer that 
he accused was the driver and sole occupant of the 
ehicle, had alcohol on his breath, had supplied an 
ncorrect name, had been with the nearby resident 
ntil the ambulance arrived, and had not consumed 
nything after the accident. The officer could smell 
iquor on the accused’s breath, observed that the 
ccused was exhibiting poor balance, staggering, 
waying, was talkative, and had watery eyes. 
urthermore, the paramedic who checked over the 
ccused told the officer there was no medical need to 
ransport the accused to the hospital against his 
ishes.  
7
 The officer began his investigation, advised the 
accused he was being detained for impaired driving and 
driving over the legal limit, provided his Charter rights, 
and demanded breath samples. The accused argued 
that the officer did not have reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe that the alleged offences had taken 
place within the previous 3 hours, as the demand 
section requires. The Crown argued that the only 
logical conclusion considering the time of the 911 call, 
the instant dispatch of the police, the scene found by 
the officer, and that the accused was being treated by 
the ambulance attendants was that the accident 
occurred within the 3 hour limitation. The trial judge 
agreed with the Crown and found the accident had 
taken place well within the previous three hours prior 
to the officer forming his opinion. Thus, the officer’s 
conclusion that care and control occurred within the 
preceding 3 hours was reasonable. Moreover, the 
officer had the necessary grounds to make the 
demand; he observed the accused’s symptoms, which 
were objectively sustainable after review. After 
considering all of the evidence including that of the 
nearby resident, the attending paramedic, and the 
police officer, the accused was convicted of impaired 
driving. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
PASSENGER IN CAR HAS NO 
STANDING TO ARGUE s.8 
CHARTER BREACH 
R. v. Campbell, 2002 ABQB 380 
 
A police officer on foot patrol 
observed a car been driven in which 
the accused, the front passenger, 
was talking on a cellular telephone. 
The rear passenger was acting 
rather frantically upon seeing the officer. The car 
pulled into a park lane near a hotel and the officer saw 
a man lean in towards the window of the vehicle. As the 
officer walked closer to the vehicle, it sped away with 
the driver failing to signal lane changes on at least two 
occasions. The foot patrol officer called for assistance 
and the vehicle was stopped by other police officers. 
While speaking to the occupants, police noted the rear 
passenger had difficulty speaking as if he had 
something in his mouth. Police subsequently seized two 
spitballs of cocaine. The driver/owner of the vehicle 
had $240 in his pocket while another $180 was found in 
his wallet and packaging for cocaine was located under 
his seat. A cellular telephone was found on the rear 
seat next to the back passenger. Two incoming 
telephone calls to the cellular were answered by police 
and the callers used language commonly used to 
purchase cocaine. The was charged  with possession of 
cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession 
of proceeds of crime (cash). The accused argued, in 
part, that he had “third party” standing to challenge 
the admissibility of the evidence obtained in violation 
of the other vehicle occupants’ Charter rights.  
 
Section 8 of the Charter protects a person from 
unreasonable search or seizure. This right however, 
does not protect a person from all intrusions into their 
privacy by the police, but only when they have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  The accused, or 
applicant in the exclusion of evidence, must first 
establish that they had a personal (or individual) 
expectation of privacy in the place searched or item 
seized. In using the relevant factors identified by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in assessing a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench 
Justice Lee found that although the accused was in the 
front passenger seat of the car using a telephone, he 
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. He 
did not have possession or control of the property, he 
did not claim ownership, nor did he have the ability to 
regulate access to the vehicle. In rejecting the 
accused’s further argument that because he was an 
alleged partner in the dial a doper scheme he had “a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the evidence 
tendered against him”, the Court held that the 
expectation of privacy must be established at the time 
of the search, not later on because the rights of two 
other persons involved with the accused may have been 
infringed. The accused was unable to demonstrate any 
identifiable legal interest in the property seized from 
the other two persons or from the vehicle. Thus, the 
accused “failed to establish…any interest in the 
searches conducted…other than a desire to exclude 
the evidence” and his application was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“In law a man is guilty when he violates the rights of 
others. In ethics he is guilty if he only thinks of doing 
so”. Immanuel Kant, 18th century Prussian geographer 
and philosopher.    
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 KNOCK ON DOOR 
TO GATHER EVIDENCE 
UNREASONABLE 
R.v Boughner,  
(2002) Docket:C34662 (OntCA) 
 
Members of a joint forces drug unit 
received reliable information that 
the accused was a mid-level cocaine 
supplier in the area and that a Mr. 
Morden was a street level dealer and 
one of the accused’s customers. The police conducted 
surveillance of a motel where a pickup truck belonging 
to the accused was observed. After observing several 
vehicles enter the parking lot and the occupants enter 
and leave room 29, the police stopped a car leaving the 
motel after its passenger entered the unit and exited 
2 minutes later and drove away. As the police 
approached this car, a passenger swallowed a piece of 
paper believed to be a packaged fold of cocaine. No 
drugs were recovered. Police continued surveillance of 
the motel room and observed the accused (who at the 
time they believed was Mr. Morden) leave and return to 
the unit. The police did not believe they had sufficient 
grounds to obtain a search warrant for the motel unit 
because they did not recover any cocaine from the car 
they stopped. Shortly before midnight, the police 
decided they would knock on the door to identify the 
occupants and seek permission to search the room. The 
officers intended to “freeze the room” if Mr. Morden 
answered the door by using as much force as necessary 
to enter and arrest him for a drug offence. The police 
would then apply for a search warrant.  
 
The police knocked on the door and when asked who 
was there by a man who came to the window, replied 
“Mike”. The man opened the door a few inches and the 
officer held up his badge and identified himself as a 
police officer. The man, appearing shocked, his eyes 
nearly doubling in size, slammed the door closed. Police 
recognized the man as the accused, kicked in the door 
and yelled “Police”. The accused ran to the back of the 
room and yelled something about a gun. The officers 
vacated the motel room and took cover in the parking 
lot. A couple of minutes later the accused emerged 
from the motel unit, surrendered to police, and was 
arrested for possession of cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking. The police re-entered the room to ensure 
there were no other occupants and to search for the 
gun. The toilet was running and several items 
associated with drug trafficking and the use of cocaine 
were observed, but the gun was not found. A second 
search was conducted and 66 grams of cocaine and 
$1000 in cash were found hidden in the bathroom. The 
accused’s wife later turned over a loaded handgun she 
had removed from the room.  
 
At trial, the accused made a motion to exclude the 
cocaine, money, handgun, and drug paraphernalia seized 
from the motel room. The trial judge held that the 
police seriously breached the accused’s privacy right 
under s.8 of the Charter by knocking on the door. 
However, he also found that the accused’s reaction at 
the door provided exigent circumstances that evidence 
might be destroyed and the further utterance about 
the gun provided additional grounds for arrest in 
relation to a weapons offence. The searches of the 
motel room were thus incidental to lawful arrest. 
Despite the original breach, the trial judge held that 
the exclusion of the drug related evidence was not 
warranted. Moreover, the gun was not obtained in a 
manner that violated the accused’s rights. It was 
turned over to the police after the completion of the 
searches, by the accused’s wife who had it in her 
possession. Consequently, the accused was convicted. 
 
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
arguing, in part, that the trial judge erred in relying on 
the accused’s reaction at the door to provide exigent 
circumstances and in finding that he was arrested 
lawfully. Further, even if he was lawfully arrested for 
drug offences, the search was for a gun and was not a 
lawful incident to arrest. Laskin J., writing for the 
unanimous appeal Court, found the trial judge erred in 
holding that the police entered the room lawfully. In 
finding “that the purpose of knocking on the motel 
room door was to secure evidence against the 
occupants”, the trial judge was correct in concluding 
that the door knock was unlawful. Allowing “the police 
to “bootstrap” their justification for entering the 
motel room based on illegally obtained evidence” was 
improper. On the other hand, when the police heard 
the accused shout something about a gun the 
circumstances facing the police significantly changed 
and now involved an “immediate public safety concern”. 
Whether the police were entitled to lawfully arrest 
the accused at this point was not so clear. Ontario’s 
highest court found it unnecessary to conclusively 
determine this issue. Even if the trial judge erred in 
admitting the evidence, no substantial wrong or 
miscarriage of justice occurred. The evidence of the 
accused’s wife was sufficient to warrant a conviction 
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 without the admission of the physical evidence. The 
accused’s conviction appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
POLICE ENTRY TO CHECK FOR 
MISSING PERSON UNLAWFUL: 
BUT EVIDENCE ADMITTED  
R. v. Rhodes, 2002 BCSC 667 
 
The police, investigating the 
disappearance of a man, attended 
the accused’s residence because it 
appeared she was the last person to 
see or talk to him and she had his 
car and keys. The landlady attended the residence with 
the police and agreed to unlock the door. The police 
observed that the windows were closed, the curtains 
were drawn, and there was no car in the driveway. Prior 
to entering, the officers knocked loudly and yelled 
“Police” several times. Upon entry, the police found the 
body of the missing man in the living room, obviously 
the victim of foul play. The police immediately secured 
the residence and posted an officer outside. A search 
warrant was subsequently obtained on the strength of 
the warrantless search. Following the execution of the 
warrant, the police took photographs of and videotaped 
the crime scene. In addition to the man’s body being 
taken from the residence, police seized several items 
including an axe with blood matching the victim’s DNA. 
During a voire dire on the charge of second degree 
murder, the accused argued, among other things, that 
the warrantless search of the residence was 
unreasonable and that the location, examination, and 
identification of the victim’s body was inadmissible. 
Furthermore, the axe and other evidence obtained as a 
result of the tainted search warrant, along with any 
expert or opinion evidence derived from it, should also 
be excluded. 
 
One of the attending officers testified he never 
considered obtaining a search warrant prior to locating 
the body of the victim because he did not know a crime 
had been committed nor did he believe he had 
reasonable grounds to obtain a warrant. He testified he 
entered the residence to check for the victim, the 
accused, and her children. He was acting on a hunch and 
did not know what he was going to find. The other 
officer also did not consider that there was a crime 
yet committed and testified she wanted to check the 
residence to ensure the accused and her children were 
not hurt. She chose to enter without a warrant because 
the victim was missing for several days under strange 
circumstances.  
 
Stromberg-Stein J. of the British Columbia Supreme 
Court concluded that the initial entry of the police into 
the accused’s residence was a warrantless search 
based on a mere suspicion or hunch. As a consequence, 
the information obtained from this unreasonable 
search must be excised from the information to obtain 
the search warrant and without it the warrant could 
not be supported. Thus, the searches and seizures at 
the accused’s home become warrantless and a breach 
of the accused’s s .8 Charter right.  
 
In assessing whether the evidence should nonetheless 
be admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the Court 
found the police acted in  bad faith because “they 
knowingly, deliberately, wilfully and flagrantly violated 
the sanctity and privacy of the accused’s home”. The 
police acknowledged an absence of reasonable grounds 
and there was no evidence that the entry was 
motivated by a sense of urgency or necessity. 
Furthermore, there was no common law or statutory 
power permitting the police to enter the accused’s 
residence even though the officers believed they had a 
common law power to check the residence to see if 
anyone was inside, either dead or alive. Stromberg-
Stein J.  concluded that the obtaining of a search 
warrant was not only impracticable, but impossible 
because the police had only a mere hunch or suspicion 
and not the necessary reasonable grounds. Despite 
these findings, the evidence was reluctantly admitted.   
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
INCIDENTAL SEIZURE 
UNREASONABLE: NOT RELATED 
TO ARREST 
R. v. Kitaitchik,  
(2002) Docket:C32740 (OntCA) 
 
The accused appealed his second 
degree murder conviction to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal by arguing, 
in part, that the trial judge erred in 
admitting evidence that was obtained in violation of the 
accused’s s. 8 Charter right. The accused, who was a 
suspect in the murder, was arrested at his home for 
possession of stolen property. A witness had received 
some property, belonging to the homicide victim, from 
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 the accused and reported this to the police. The day 
after the arrest, the accused was taken from his cell 
to a private room and asked to remove all of his 
clothing. In exchange, the accused was given a fresh 
set of clothing obtained from his home. Several fibers 
found on the clothing were consistent with a ligature 
and sweater found at the murder scene. Although the 
investigating officer who ordered the clothing seized 
testified he did not have reasonable grounds to arrest 
the accused for the murder at the time, he stated that 
the seizure related to the murder investigation and not 
the possession of stolen property charge. However, he 
believed he had the authority to seize the clothing as 
an incident to the accused’s arrest for the possession 
offence. 
 
The trial judge concluded that the common law power 
of search incident to a lawful arrest did not allow the 
police to search for or seize items for offences 
unrelated to the reason for arrest. Here, the clothing 
was seized in relation to the murder and not in relation 
to the possession offence for which he was arrested. 
The search was not lawful as an incident to arrest and 
was thus unreasonable. However, the evidence was 
nonetheless admissible under s.24(2) of the Charter. 
The accused submitted that the trial judge seriously 
misapprehended the seriousness of the Charter breach 
and the effect of the exclusion of the evidence on the 
administration of justice. He argued that the accused 
was subjected to the equivalent of a strip search 
resulting in a violation of the most intimate of privacy 
rights. In rejecting the argument that the trial judge’s 
assessment of the seriousness of the breach was 
unreasonable, Doherty J. for the unanimous appeal 
Court stated: 
 
[The accused] was not subjected to a strip search as 
described in R. v. Golden [(2001) 159 C.C.C. (3d) 449 
(S.C.C.)]. While the seizure of his clothing was clearly an 
intrusive act, it was not akin to stripping him for the 
purpose of viewing or examining his most private areas. 
The seizure occurred in a private room with only one 
other person present. No force or intimidation was used 
and the [accused] was immediately provided with a fresh 
set of his own clothing. No attempt was made to examine 
the [accused’s] body. The [accused] did not testify on 
the voire dire and it is sheer speculation to suggest that 
he was somehow humiliated or traumatized by the 
seizure.  
 
And later: 
 
The seizure also occurred after a lawful arrest and the 
[accused] was lawfully in police custody. In such 
circumstances, a person has a reduced expectation of 
privacy. 
 
The accused further argued that the judge erred in 
finding that the officer acted in good faith. He 
suggested that the officer should have known that he 
was not entitled to seize the clothing for a murder 
investigation as an incident to the lawful arrest for a 
different charge. Ontario’s highest court stated that 
although “it is now clear that the power to seize as an 
incident of arrest does not extend to the seizure of 
material to provide evidence of an offence other than 
the offence for which the person was arrested”, at the 
time of the accused’s arrest (1991) the law in this 
regard was unsettled. The officer’s belief that he 
could seize the clothing was not unreasonable.  
Furthermore, Doherty J. went on to add that the s. 8 
violation resulted from the investigating officer not 
fully appreciating “the impact of the evidence in his 
possession and his authority to seize the clothing in 
relation to the possession charge”. He stated: 
 
I would add two further considerations.  First, even 
though the officer testified that he did not have 
reasonable and probable grounds to charge the [accused] 
with murder at the time he seized the clothing, I think, 
on any objective assessment, he had such grounds.  There 
was a clear basis for inferring that the theft and the 
homicide were part of the same transaction.  The officer 
had very good reason to believe that the [accused] was in 
possession of stolen property taken from the victim’s 
apartment shortly after the theft and homicide 
occurred.  The [accused’s] possession of the stolen 
property so close in time to the theft and homicide 
provided reasonable and probable grounds to believe that 
he was implicated in the homicide.  Second, although the 
officer did not purport to seize the clothing in relation to 
the possession charge on which the [accused] was 
arrested, the clothing was capable of providing evidence 
to support that charge.  If the clothing placed the 
[accused] at the scene of the theft, it would provide 
cogent support for the charge that he was in possession 
of stolen property knowing that the property had been 
stolen.   
 
As a result, the appeal court could not find that the 
trial judge erred in his assessment of good faith with 
respect to the conduct of the police. The appeal was 
dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca  
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 KICK TO GROIN RUPTURING 
TESTICLE NOT EXCESSIVE 
Bolianatz v. Edmonton Police Service, 
2002 ABQB 284 
 
The plaintiff sued police claiming 
damages for assault during an 
force. To claim a defence in s. 5(1) the officer must be 
“required or authorized by law to perform an act in 
administering or enforcing the law and that he acted on 
reasonable grounds”. Reasonable grounds requires 
officers believing they have reasonable grounds and 
that their belief is objectively established on the 
evidence. 
 arrest. The plaintiff got into an 
altercation outside a downtown hotel 
with a male from whom he had been 
earlier ripped off in a drug transaction. A uniformed 
police officer observed the plaintiff on top of another 
male dealing blows to his head. The officer pulled his 
car partly onto the curb, exited his vehicle, identified 
himself as a police officer, and shouted at the two to 
stop fighting. After the men failed to respond to the 
officer’s directions, the officer tried to grab their 
arms without success. The officer then grabbed the 
two by their collars and tried to separate them. When 
ordered to get to the ground, the second male 
complied. However, the plaintiff did not comply with 
the officer’s demand, braced himself on the police car 
with one hand, and grabbed hold of the officer’s gun 
belt with the other. 
 
Bar patrons from across the street attended the area 
to watch what was occurring. The officer did not know 
if these persons were friends of the men but knew he 
had to get the situation under control. He considered 
calling for backup on his radio, but both his hands were 
occupied. He could use the baton or pepper spray on his 
belt, but he would have to release the other man who 
may have run away, could go after the plaintiff, or 
assault the officer. The plaintiff was too close for the 
use of pepper spray and the officer did not want to 
injure the plaintiff’s eyesor receive splash back, which 
would render him defenceless. The officer chose to 
kick the plaintiff as hard as he could, striking him in 
the groin. The plaintiff was arrested, handcuffed and 
subsequently driven home after neither party wished 
to pursue charges. As a result of the kick, the 
plaintiff’s testicle ruptured and after surgery was the 
size of a “pea” which made him feel like a “freak”. 
 
Section 25(1) Criminal Code 
 
Section 25(1) of the Criminal Code provides a defence 
to police officers, protecting them from criminal and 
civil liability, if they act on reasonable grounds and do 
not use unnecessary force. The onus for proving the 
justification lies with the police officer using the 
Lawful Arrest 
 
Bensler J. of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench 
concluded that the officer could ground an arrest, thus 
be acting lawfully, in three ways: 
 
• Assault: Section 495(1) of the Criminal Code allows 
the police to arrest persons they find committing a 
criminal offence. The officer found the plaintiff 
on top of the other man getting the better of him 
and the arrest was necessary to prevent the 
continuation of the assault. 
 
• Assaulting a peace officer: During the officer’s 
intervention, the plaintiff grabbed his gun belt. 
This was sufficient to provide the officer with 
reasonable grounds to restrain the plaintiff for 
the purpose of arresting him for assaulting a peace 
officer. 
 
• Breach of the peace: A breach of the peace 
involves “an act or actions which result in actual or 
threatened harm to someone or where public alarm 
or excitement is caused”. Section 31 of the 
Criminal Code allows an officer who witnesses a 
breach of the peace to arrest anyone they find 
committing the breach or who on reasonable 
grounds the officer believes is about to join in or 
renew the breach. Furthermore, at common law the 
police have the power to arrest or detain persons 
for apprehended breaches provided the officer 
has reasonable grounds the breach will be imminent 
and the risk of occurrence is substantial. In this 
case, the assault was clearly a breach and was 
attracting the attention of and generating 
excitement with the patrons from the bar across 
the street. The officer acted reasonably in 
believing that a “further breach of the peace was 
imminent and that risk that it would occur 
substantial”. 
 
Section 27(1) Criminal Code 
 
Section 27(1) of the Criminal Code permits anyone, 
including the police, to use force to prevent the 
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 commission of an offence likely to cause immediate and 
serious injury to a person and for which the person may 
be arrested without warrant. Here, the use of force 
was necessary to prevent the plaintiff from assaulting 
the other man. Assault is an offence for which the 
person may be arrested under s.495(1) of the Code and 
the continued striking to the victim’s head would likely 
cause immediate and serious injury.  
 
Excessive Force 
 
The test for determining whether a police officer used 
excessive force will require an examination of a number 
of factors including “the seriousness of the offence, 
the heat of the moment, the conduct of the offender, 
and the availability of other means of arrest”. 
However, “an officer is not expected to measure 
carefully the exact amount of force that the situation 
requires”. The proper test is whether the force was 
objectively reasonable from the situation in which the 
officer found themselves. In this case, Bensler J. 
would “not second guess [the officer’s] decision given 
the volatile situation in which he found himself” and 
concluded the officer was justified.  
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
CHRISTMAS CARDS 
DEMONSTRATE ATTITUDE OF 
OFFICER 
R. v. Detillieux 2002 BCPC 0212 
 
A police officer and strike force 
member received information from 
two reliable sources that the 
accused was trafficking in 
methamphetamine and was spending some time in the 
area of an apartment known to the officer as an 
address where trafficking occurred and where he had 
previously arrested two or three people before, one 
for a drug offence. The officer was also told that two 
other people spending time at this apartment had 
outstanding warrants. The officer also received 
information from an outside agency that the accused 
was wanted on an outstanding warrant for careless use 
of a firearm and possession of a restricted weapon 
with ammunition. The officer and three other members 
set up surveillance on the apartment building to locate 
any of the three wanted persons without success. A 
week later, the officer was on his way home from the 
detachment when he saw the accused wearing a 
backpack and headphones leave the apartment building 
and step out onto the street. The officer drove around 
the block, parked his car, and proceeded on foot.  
 
The officer observed the accused speaking to two 
young females and a brief hand contact between the 
accused and one of the females. When the two females 
separated from the accused, the officer who was in his 
civilian clothes and in possession of his badge, pepper 
spray, and a small flashlight, jogged up to the accused, 
and told him he was under arrest for the outstanding 
warrant. The officer patted down the accused and 
found an address/phone book and a large sum of cash in 
his pocket and a cell phone in his jacket. As the officer 
began to unzip the accused’s jacket, he said he had a 
starter pistol in his pants, which the officer removed. 
The accused was Chartered and read the police warning 
from a card. The officer telephoned the police 
detachment for assistance and while awaiting the 
arrival of other officers, searched the accused’s 
backpack where he found a large baggie of 
methamphetimine. The gun, a starter pistol modified to 
fire .22 calibre ammunition, was loaded. The accused 
was charged with drug and weapons offences. During 
the voire dire, the accused argued that he was 
subjected to an unreasonable search and seizure.  
 
The Arrest 
 
The officer testified that he did not have reasonable 
grounds to arrest the accused for trafficking prior to 
the search. With respect to the arrest warrant, the 
officer testified he had not taken steps to update the 
status of the warrant since he had received the 
information 8 days prior to the arrest. The accused 
testified he had met the officer at the courthouse two 
days before the arrest and told him he was taking care 
of the warrant while the officer confirmed he had 
spoken to the accused at the courthouse, but could not 
recall the conversation about the warrant. The officer 
also agreed in cross examination that part of his duty 
as a police officer was to intimidate and scare people in 
an effort to create the impression he was watching 
them and would get them and send them to jail. The 
accused filed as evidence, five Christmas cards the 
officer had sent to persons he had arrested for drug 
related crimes stating, “We know you’re dealing drugs. 
Stop it, or I’ll arrest you”. Pothecary J. held that the 
officer, if he had a reasonable belief the warrant was 
outstanding, should have arrested the accused at the 
courthouse. Furthermore, by not checking on the 
status of the warrant after that date, the officer did 
not act in good faith. The judge found that the officer 
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 deliberately did not call the dispatcher before making 
the arrest so he would avoid finding out the warrant 
was no longer outstanding. Thus, the arrest was not 
lawful. 
 
The Detention 
 
The police are entitled to detain persons for the 
purpose of investigation but may only search those 
persons for safety reasons, not evidence. The 
detention in this case was based on a “narrow suspicion” 
and therefore the officer did not have reasonable 
grounds to search for evidence of a drug transaction. 
Although the officer testified he searched for his 
safety, the trial judge held that it was a search for 
drugs and not a search for weapons. During the 
“apparent pat-down” of the accused, the officer 
removed items only logically connected to drugs, not 
safety. Furthermore, the officer’s attitude as 
demonstrated by the sending of the Christmas cards, 
and his description of his police task, showed a 
deliberate and flagrant ignoring of persons rights.  
Pothecary J. stated: 
 
I am satisfied that [the officer] has taken it upon 
himself to “clean up Maple Ridge” and that he believes 
this is something he is entitled to do by any means 
necessary. I disagree with that interpretation of his job, 
his duties and his entitlements. This has caused me to 
seriously doubt the objectivity one expects of a trained 
and experienced police officer in making his observations, 
recording his observations, and later testifying to those 
observations when required to do so in court.  
 
The Charter breach was ruled serious and the evidence 
was excluded. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
SPECULATIVE INCIDENTAL 
SEARCH UNREASONABLE: 
EVIDENCE NONETHELESS 
ADMITTED 
R. v. Pniak, 2002 SKQB 202 
 
The accused was stopped for 
speeding and found to be a 
prohibited driver. He was arrested 
and Chartered for driving while 
prohibited and searched by an 
officer. Noting a bulge in his inside jacket pocket, the 
officer reached in and found several grams of loose 
marihuana. The accused stated the marihuana had been 
in his pocket for a long time. As the officer showed it 
to his Corporal, the wind blew it away. The accused was 
informed he was also under arrest for possession of a 
controlled substance. The accused’s vehicle was 
searched and the police found three vials containing 
Ritalin and Talwin. The accused was then arrested for 
possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of 
trafficking. At trial, the Court of Queen’s Bench judge 
found the search of the vehicle to be unreasonable.  
 
Search Incidental to Arrest 
 
For a search to be reasonable as an incident to a lawful 
arrest, the search must be truly incident to arrest. In 
this sense, it must be made for safety or evidentiary 
reasons. McLellan J. held that the search of the 
vehicle to discover more marihuana was “purely 
speculative”: 
 
The marihuana had obviously been in the accused’s pocket 
for some time. The state of the marihuana did not 
suggest any recent usage by the accused. There was no 
suggestion that the accused appeared under the 
influence of any drug. 
 
Although the police do not require reasonable grounds 
to believe they will locate evidence, there must be a 
reasonable prospect of finding evidence related to the 
charge. They did not and therefore had no valid 
purpose incidental to the arrest. 
 
Reasonable Grounds to Search 
 
Warrantless vehicle searches “may be conducted in 
circumstances in which an officer has reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe the vehicle contains 
evidence of the commission of an offence, and exigent 
circumstances will not permit the obtaining of a search 
warrant”. Acting on a mere suspicion is not sufficient. 
The police did not have reasonable grounds to believe 
there would likely be more marihuana in the vehicle, 
and even if they did, the police had control of the van 
and moved it to the detachment. They were not facing 
any urgency with respect to the van and could have 
obtained a warrant. 
 
Admission of the Evidence 
 
Although the police violated the accused’s right to be 
secure against unreasonable search or seizure, the 
breach was minimal. A person’s expectation of privacy 
with respect to a vehicle is less than a home or their 
person and more so when the vehicle is in the control 
of the police. The accused was lawfully arrested and 
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 was the search was not obtrusive even though it was 
based on only suspicion. The evidence was admitted and 
the accused was convicted. 
 
Complete case available at www.lawsociety.sk.ca 
 
OFFICER’s OPINION 
SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT 
IMPAIRED CONVICTION 
R. v. Wadhams, 2002 BCSC 852 
 
A police officer, who observed the 
accused stumble into the side of his 
truck, enter it, and drive away 
erratically, stopped him in his 
driveway after he exited his vehicle. 
The officer observed that the accused’s eyes were 
watery and glassy, the whites were pink, his body was 
“rotating”, and he had difficultly removing his licence 
from his wallet when requested. The officer also 
testified he could smell a faint odour of alcohol but 
could not state if it was coming from the accused’s 
breath or his clothing. The officer formed the opinion 
that the accused was “very drunk” and a breathalyzer 
test was unnecessary. The accused was convicted of 
impaired driving but appealed to the Supreme Court of 
British Columbia arguing there was no evidence (such as 
a breathalyzer analysis, a witness testifying he 
consumed liquor, or an odour of alcohol on the accused’s 
breath) that he was impaired by alcohol. In dismissing 
the appeal, Williamson J. held that intoxication is not 
such an exceptional condition that only a medical 
expert can diagnose it. Ordinary persons may provide 
their opinion that a person is drunk. He stated: 
 
Here the police officer formed the opinion the accused 
was “very drunk”. He did so, [one] can assume, on the 
basis of the various observations he made which were 
consistent with a person being drunk. A drunk person is, 
given the normal understanding of the word, impaired by 
alcohol. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“Character is like a tree and reputation like its shadow. 
The shadow is what we think of it: the tree is the real 
thing”. Abraham Lincoln, U.S. president 
 
 
 
 
ASSAULT BY OFFICER RENDERS 
STATEMENT INADMISSIBLE 
R. v. Sabri,  
(2002) Docket:C34474 (OntCA) 
 
The accused and his three 
companions were arrested by the 
police for murder after an 
undercover officer arranged to meet 
the accused in a parking lot. During a subsequent 
interview, he told the police that the victim fell to the 
ground after he had hit the victim in the jaw following 
an altercation between the two while walking on the 
street.  During the trial voire dire, the accused alleged 
he was repeatedly assaulted and threatened by the 
police following his arrest, which included: 
 
• At the scene of the arrest having his face pushed 
into the trunk of the police car; 
• While in the police elevator being punched in the 
hip causing a bruise and which injured the wrist of 
the officer in the process; and 
• In the interview room being repeatedly slapped and 
threatened to be sent back to Iraq along with his 
family if he did not tell the police what happened. 
 
As a consequence, the accused told police what 
happened and then repeated his statement on video.  
 
Although the trial judge rejected most of the 
accused’s testimony, he concluded that the accused 
had been assaulted in the elevator when he was being 
escorted to the cell block by the two detectives. The 
accused was struck with such force that it bruised the 
accused’s hip as depicted in a photograph taken the 
following day and caused a cut to the officer’s wrist 
under his bracelet. Even though the officer denied 
hitting the accused or needing a bandage, a video 
recording of the officer interviewing another person an 
hour after the elevator incident showed the officer 
with a bandage on his right wrist. The bandage was 
then missing from the videotaped interview of the 
accused and the officer could not provide an 
explanation. Despite this finding, the trial judge 
concluded that the assault was not sufficiently 
connected to the statements to affect their 
voluntariness. The statements were held to be 
admissible and the accused was convicted of 
manslaughter. The accused appealed to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal arguing that the trial judge erred in 
finding his statements were voluntary. 
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 The confessions rule requires that the Crown prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a statement given to a 
person in authority (police officer) was voluntary. In 
this case, the finding that the assault occurred was 
fatal to the admissibility of the statements.  
 
Credibility 
 
First, the officers’ credibility was adversely affected 
by their denial of the assault and the truthfulness of 
their entire evidence concerning the first interview 
was suspect. Moreover, this concern was amplified by 
the fact the accused’s first statement was not 
recorded despite the availability of recording 
facilities. The trial judge did not subject the officers’ 
credibility to the same scrutiny as that of the accused. 
The officer’s credibility was “seriously undermined” 
and the burden of proving the voluntariness of the 
statement beyond a reasonable doubt was not 
satisfied. 
 
Voluntariness 
 
Second, the trial judge erred in concluding that the 
assault was not sufficiently connected to the 
statements. The intervening six hours between the 
interview and the assault when the accused was in cells 
was not sufficient to break a temporal connection. The 
same two detectives in the elevator were the ones who 
interviewed the accused.  There was a reasonable 
doubt that the statement was not made without fear 
of prejudice. The first statement in the interview room 
was not made voluntarily and should have been ruled 
inadmissible. Since the second recorded statement was 
a derivative of the first, it was also is inadmissible and 
a new trial was ordered.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
ARTICULABLE CAUSE VEHICLE 
SEIZURE REASONABLE 
R. v. Hart, 2002 BCSC 659 
 
The police were investigating a 
report by two 5 and 7 year old girls 
who were playing near their rural 
homes  that they were taken and 
placed in car, driven to a secluded 
area, and were sexually assaulted. The suspect was 
described as a tall, slim white male, with blue eyes and 
blond hair pulled back in a pony tail and wearing a green 
jacket, black shirt, black jeans, and a large belt buckle. 
The vehicle driven by the suspect was described as a 
small grey four door with red seats, a black dash, black 
steering wheel, and a container between the front seat 
holding CD’s. The following day the police attended a 
local restaurant at a service station complex and found 
the accused, who matched eight of ten suspect 
descriptors, seated at a table with three other 
persons. After speaking with the suspect, this person 
identified himself and indicated he drove a grey 1987 
Chevrolet Spectrum that was parked in the parking lot. 
An officer went to the parking lot and located a 1987 
four door grey Chevrolet Spectrum with dark red seat 
covers and a box of CD’s on the front floor.  
 
As a result, the police requested the accused 
accompany them to the station to provide a statement. 
When he told the police he would drive himself to the 
detachment, the officer told him they would prefer he 
accompany them. He agreed, returned to his 
companions, gave his car keys to a friend, and asked 
him to take the vehicle home. As the friend approached 
the vehicle, the police, who were watching it, told him 
the vehicle wasn’t going anywhere. The vehicle was 
subsequently towed to and secured at the police 
identification bay. Following the interview, the accused 
was arrested and his clothing was seized. The next day, 
a search warrant was obtained for the vehicle.  
 
A voire dire was held to determine the admissibility of 
evidence (including forensic evidence) obtained from 
the search of the car and the seizure of the accused’s 
clothing. The police officers testified they did not 
have reasonable grounds to arrest the accused at the 
restaurant nor did they had enough grounds to obtain a 
search warrant. However, the police felt they had 
exigent circumstances and that they should secure the 
vehicle but not search it. It was not until the interview 
with the accused that the police felt they had 
reasonable grounds to obtain a search warrant. The 
accused argued that at the time the police seized the 
car in the parking lot, they did so unlawfully and 
committed a theft; they did not have reasonable 
grounds and were acting unlawfully. Further, 
information obtained from conversations with the 
accused that was subsequently ruled inadmissible (see 
R. v. Hart, 2002 BCSC 634) was used to support both 
the search warrant and the subsequent arrest.  
 
The Seizure of the Car 
 
Warrantless seizures are prima facie unreasonable and 
the Crown bears the burden of proving that the seizure 
was reasonable. The vehicle was seized at the 
restaurant when the police denied the accused’s friend 
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 access to it. Although the police did not have 
reasonable grounds to arrest, the British Columbia 
Supreme Court concluded that they did have an 
articulable cause to detain the vehicle to preserve 
potential evidence while seeking judicial authorization. 
Parret J. stated: 
 
In my view, the concept of articulable cause exists in this 
country and, although an exercise of such power must be 
exceedingly rare given the parameters of the Charter, I 
find that the seizure of the accused’s vehicle in the 
particular circumstances of this case was a valid exercise 
of this power. 
 
I find the seizure in the circumstances of the present 
case to be directly analogous to the securing of a 
potential crime scene while the investigation proceeds.  I 
find that the seizure, within the first of the three 
prerequisites outlined by Lamer, C.J.C., in Casalake, 
[(1998), 121 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.)], was authorized by 
law. 
 
The authorities are legion that speak of the diminished 
or lower expectation of privacy that attaches to motor 
vehicles.  When that diminished expectation of privacy is 
balanced against the state’s interest in law enforcement 
and the investigation of serious offences, the balance, in 
this instance, falls very much on the side of the 
authorities.  In addition, the seizure in this case was 
utilized for the express and limited purpose of 
preserving potential evidence and no search was 
conducted until a judicial authorization was obtained on 
the basis of an Information to Obtain which disclosed 
full details of the seizure. 
 
I find that the seizure of the accused’s vehicle in the 
unique circumstances of this case does not constitute a 
breach of the accused’s s. 8 Charter rights.  I further 
find that the seizure in the circumstances was a 
reasonable step taken to preserve what might well be 
crucial and sensitive evidence. 
 
The Search Warrant 
 
The accused argued that the search warrant was “an 
attempt to paper over an unlawful act”. Search 
warrants are presumed valid and the burden in 
challenging a warrant rests with the accused who must 
establish that there was no basis upon which the 
justice should have been satisfied in the existence of 
reasonable grounds. Even though the statement made 
by the accused was ruled inadmissible and must be 
excluded from the information used to support the 
warrant, there remained ample evidence upon which a 
search warrant could be properly issued. The warrant 
was valid and the search it authorized did not violate 
s.8 of the Charter. 
 
The Seizure of Clothing 
 
The accused submitted that the arrest was founded 
upon the statements unlawfully obtained by the police 
and the arrest was therefore unlawful. As a 
consequence, the seizure of the accused’s clothing was 
unreasonable and should be excluded. In describing the 
power of arrest, Parret J. stated: 
 
A peace officer is empowered by the provisions of s. 495 
of the Criminal Code to arrest without warrant “ . . . a 
person . . . who, on reasonable and probable grounds, he 
believes has committed . . . an indictable offence”.  There 
are two aspects to determining whether or not an arrest 
is valid; the first is a subjective belief on the part of the 
police officer that reasonable and probable grounds 
existed for the arrest; and secondly, the requirement 
that, viewed objectively, such grounds existed.  This 
latter requirement is met by applying the test of 
whether a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the 
officer, would have believed that reasonable and 
probable grounds to make the arrest existed.  
 
At the time of arrest, the officer believed he had 
reasonable grounds. Furthermore, the objective 
information available to the police was sufficient to 
constitute reasonable grounds and a reasonable person 
with the same information would have believed 
reasonable grounds existed. Although the objective 
criteria may have existed before the officer made the 
arrest, it did not affect the arrest’s validity. The 
detention may have affected the admissibility of other 
conversations but it did not render the arrest invalid 
where proper grounds excised. The arrest and 
subsequent seizure of the accused’s clothing incidental 
to the arrest was lawful. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca  
 
8 MINUTE DELAY IN TAKING 
BREATH SAMPLES AS SOON AS 
PRACTICABLE 
R. v. Cresswell, 
(2002) Docket:C37055 (OntCA) 
 
A police officer demanded the accused 
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July 2002 provide a sample of his breath into a 
roadside screening device. Because the 
device did not work, a replacement was 
delivered to the officer 15 minutes 
later and the accused failed. He was arrested for 
driving over 80mg% and read his right to counsel 
followed by the breathalyzer demand. The accused was 
17
 transported to the police station where he was 
permitted to call his father 8 minutes after arrival. 
The breathalyzer technician was taking samples from 
another person and 10 minutes expired between the 
time of this persons last sample and when the 
technician began the input process on the intoxilyzer in 
anticipation of the accused’s samples. The accused 
provided samples of 150mg% and 140mg%.  At trial, the 
accused was convicted of over 80mg% but appealed to 
the Ontario Superior Court of Justice arguing that the 
samples were not taken as soon as practicable and the 
delay was unexplained.  
 
Hockin J. concluded that the there was only an 8 
minute delay from the time the accused completed his 
call to his father and the time the technician began the 
intoxilyzer set up process. The legal test is not “the 
very earliest moment” and the Crown was not required 
to account for each minute. Further, absent express 
language in the Criminal Code, there is no requirement 
that a technician with two persons from whom samples 
are to be taken must be received at once even though 
the machine is technically capable of it. The accused 
further appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal again 
contending that the samples were not taken as soon as 
practicable. Although the appeal court granted a new 
trial on a credibility issue, it held that the lower courts 
did not err in finding that the samples were taken “as 
soon as practicable” despite the eight minute delay 
from the end of the accused’s telephone conversation 
and the time the set-up began  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca  
 
STAY NOT WARRANTED 
DESPITE POLICE ASSAULT 
R. v. Madeley,  
(2002) Docket:C29491 (OntCA) 
 
The accused appealed his first 
O
j
i
i
r
a
a
o
the assault, they took no action. Although, the Crown 
learned of the incident and disclosed a copy of the 
videotape to the accused, they did not disclose the 
police discussions about denying the incident until after 
the trial had proceeded.  The officer who assaulted 
the accused subsequently plead guilty to assault and 
the others involved in the discussions to destroy the 
tape were disciplined under Ontario’s Police Services 
Act. At trial, the judge excluded as evidence the 
videotaped interview, an audio-taped interview 
revealing the whereabouts of the gun, the rifle itself, 
and other evidence. The accused brought a motion for 
a stay of proceedings alleging the breaches of the 
accused’s ss. 7 and 10(b) Charter rights along with the 
actions of the police and Crown constituted an abuse of 
process which impeded his ability to make full answer 
and defence. The trial judge concluded that the police 
conduct in this case, although “blatant and 
inexcusable”, did not justify the extraordinary remedy 
of a stay of proceedings. On further appeal, Carthy J. 
for a unanimous Ontario Court of Appeal was unable to 
conclude that the trial judge’s decision would be an 
injustice. The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca  
 
STRIP SEARCH 
UNREASONABLE, BUT 
EVIDENCE ADMITTED 
R. v. B.B., 2002 BCCA 388 
 
A police officer received 
information from another officer 
that a previously proven reliable 
source told him that the accused, a 
young offender, was in possession of cocaine, carried it 
in his underpants, and would be dealing it by using a cell 
phone from a red Chevy Sprint registered to a “J.M.”. 
The accused was known to the officer, from casual 
V
Jdegree murder conviction for the 
shooting death of his 14 year old 
girlfriend’s grandmother to the 
ntario Court of Appeal, arguing, in part, that the trial 
udge should have stayed the proceedings. During an 
nterrogation following the accused’s arrest, one of the 
nvestigating officers assaulted him while demanding he 
eveal the whereabouts of the murder weapon. The 
ccused told the police where he had discarded the gun 
nd they subsequently recovered it. While the police 
fficers discussed erasing the videotape and denying 
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uly 2002 street sources,  as a cocaine dealer and he  had dealt 
with him on a previous file. The officer, in the company 
of a police cadet and civilian ride along, observed the 
accused later that evening driving a vehicle matching 
the description provided. The vehicle was stopped and 
found to be registered to “J.M.”. As the officer 
approached the car, he observed the accused turn off 
a cell phone. The officer detained the accused under 
the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and 
conducted a strip search by asking the accused to take 
down his pants and underwear in the car. The officer 
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 noticed a plastic baggie, subsequently found to contain 
nine flaps of cocaine, in the accused’s genital area. The 
cocaine and some cash, which was also found, were 
seized. The accused was arrested and charged with 
possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. 
At trial, the judge found that the officer had 
reasonable grounds to detain and search the accused 
based on the detailed information received by the 
officer earlier that day. The informant was reliable and 
had previously provided useful information in the past 
and the events that unfolded were also consistent with 
the tip. Finally, there was information from the casual 
street sources that the accused was a drug dealer. 
Concerning the need for the strip search in the car, 
the trial judge accepted the three reasons advanced by 
the officer: 
 
1. if the information had turned out to be incorrect, 
the accused would be on his way and would not have 
to be taken down to the station to be searched; 
2. it was very busy and there was a limited number of 
officers working. The officer did not feel justified 
in taking the accused to the station and going 
through the process of booking him in; and 
3. the need to protect the evidence from possible 
destruction by the accused during the drive to the 
station. 
 
Further, the trial judge found the search was 
conducted in a reasonable manner. The accused 
remained in the car in a very dark area where there 
was little traffic and the officer stood in the open 
door of the car between the accused and anyone who 
may come by. The evidence was admitted and the 
accused was convicted. The accused appealed his 
conviction to the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
arguing, among other grounds, that the police violated 
the accused’s rights to be free from arbitrary 
detention and to be secure against unreasonable search 
and seizure.  
 
Arbitrary Detention 
 
The accused alleged that there was no evidence 
allowing the Court to objectively assess the reliability 
of the informant. Prowse J., for the unanimous court, 
dismissed this ground of appeal. She concluded that, 
although the evidence supporting reasonable grounds 
was borderline, the trial judge did not err: 
 
The detailed nature of the tip, the fact that it was 
provided a short time before [the accused] was spotted 
by [the officer], the extent to which the details of the 
tip were reinforced by the events as they unfolded, and 
the additional information possessed by [the officer] as 
to [the accused’s] reputation as a drug dealer, were 
factors which  the trial judge was entitled to consider in 
determining whether the detention was justified. 
 
Unreasonable Search or Seizure 
 
In light of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. 
v. Golden 2001 SCC 833, the accused submitted that 
there were no exigent circumstances to strip search 
the accused in the field rather than at the police 
station, a five minute drive away. In the absence of 
such grounds, it was argued the search amounted to an 
unreasonable search and seizure.  In the case of a field 
strip search, the onus is on the Crown to prove that 
there are reasonable grounds to believe a strip search 
is warranted as well as exigent circumstances 
justifying the search be conducted on the street prior 
to being transported to the police station. In this case, 
the reasons provided by the officer were not 
sufficient to meet the onus, and the search was 
unreasonable. Prowse J. wrote: 
 
In my view, the reasons [the officer] gave for strip 
searching [the accused] at the scene, rather than at the 
police station did not meet the requirements for a lawful 
strip search as an incident of arrest set forth in Golden.  
It cannot be justification for a strip search in the field 
that, if the search turns out to be negative, the citizen 
searched can then go on his or her way.  This rationale 
suggests that a strip search is really a way of doing 
detained citizens a favour by saving them a possible trip 
to the police station.  I think it is fair to say that the 
majority of citizens would rather be spared the favour.  
In fact, the evidence here is to the effect that [the 
officer] was motivated by the desire to save himself a 
trip to the police station, if possible, in order to avoid 
the time and paper work which such a trip would involve.  
Had there been evidence of a significant need for his 
services at the time of this arrest, beyond the usual 
requirements of patrol duty, that would have been a valid 
consideration in determining whether exigent 
circumstances existed which justified a search in the 
field.  There was, however, no such evidence of exigent 
circumstances here.  Further, there is no evidence of a 
concern that [the accused] might be armed; nor is there 
any persuasive evidence that [the accused] could have 
disposed of the cocaine while being taken from his car to 
the police station.  Presumably he would have been 
handcuffed in such a manner as to prevent him from 
removing anything from his pants.  He would also have 
been in the custody of [the officer] and in the company 
of the ride-along, who could have kept him under 
                                                 
3 See Volume 1 Issue 13 of this publication. 
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 observation for the short drive to the police station. 
 
Despite this holding, the Court nonetheless admitted 
the evidence: 
 
While I am troubled by the extent to which the 
admission of evidence following a Charter breach may be 
seen as trivializing the breach in a case such as this, I am 
unable to conclude that the admission of this evidence in 
these circumstances would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute.  It is common ground that the 
cocaine was real evidence which would have been 
discovered in any event and that its admission would not 
affect the fairness of the trial.  There is no suggestion 
that [the officer] was acting in bad faith.  In that 
regard, it is relevant that the police at that time did not 
have the benefit of the analysis in Golden.  Further, the 
manner in which the search was carried out, although 
undoubtedly invasive, was such that [the accused’s] 
privacy was protected as much as possible.  In that 
regard, I note that [the officer] asked his ride-along 
partner to move out of visual range; he asked [the 
accused] to remove as little of his clothing as the 
information he had been provided as to the location of 
the drugs required; he did not require [the accused] to 
step out of the car; there was limited lighting and no 
passenger traffic, or evidence of other traffic, in the 
area at the time; and the search did not involve the use 
of actual force.  While I would regard the breach as 
serious, despite these factors, I conclude that it was not 
sufficiently serious to warrant excluding the evidence.  
Certainly, I would not describe the search as a flagrant 
violation of [the accused’s] rights.   
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca   
 
SENTENCE REDUCTION  
AS A REMEDY TO CHARTER 
BREACH REJECTED 
R. v. Carpenter, 2002 BCCA 301 
 
The accused was charged and 
a
t
C
s
h
t
a
breaches that did not result in the exclusion of the 
heroin against him should then, as an appropriate 
remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter, result in a 
reduction to his sentence.  
 
4
 
In a two-to-one decision, the majority of the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal rejected this argument. 
Newbury J. (Smith J. concurring) held that such an 
approach would improperly shift the focus of 
sentencing from the accused and the offence he 
committed to the non-serious Charter breaches 
committed by the Customs officers.  Sentences 
blunted by a Charter breach may well not be 
proportionate to the gravity of the offence or the 
degree of offender responsibility and would have even 
more serious implications if the offender is a danger to 
society. Newbury J. opined: 
 
I also have concerns that on a practical level, it would be 
stretching judicial resources to their limit if the door 
were to be opened widely to arguments of this kind in 
sentencing hearings. In the real world, such hearings 
would be prolonged and complicated by the raising of 
minor and even trivial allegations of Charter breaches in 
hopes that the result would be a reduction in sentences. 
 
Donald J., on the other hand, concluded that the 
Charter violations should be recognized in the 
calculation of an appropriate sentence and result in a 
sentence reduction if the breach mitigated the 
offence or imposed a hardship. He expressed 
disagreement that the s. 24(2) analysis exhausted the 
alternatives for a Charter breach and precluded a 
reduction in sentence as a remedy. The strip search, x-
rays, and laxatives provided to the accused which 
resulted in the Charter breaches were” a hardship or 
penalty suffered by the [accused]” for which he was 
not credited on sentencing. Even though the breaches 
did not warrant the exclusion of evidence, they must 
be factored into the overall punishment of the accused.  
Donald J. held that a reduction in sentence for the 
V
Jconvicted of importing a controlled 
substance into Canada when he 
swallowed 1.3 pounds of heroin 
pellets in Thailand, boarded a plane, 
nd returned to Vancouver. Although he was convicted, 
he Court found his rights under ss. 8 and 10(b) of the 
harter had been violated. Although the inculpatory 
tatement provided to the police was excluded4, the 
eroin was admitted under s. 24(2) of the Charter and 
he accused received a six-year sentence. The accused 
ppealed his sentence, in part, by arguing that the 
                                                
 See conviction appeal: R. v. Carpenter 2001 BCCA  31. 
violations did not indicate a reduced culpability in the 
offence, but appropriately balanced the penalty so the 
accused would not be over-punished. He would have 
reduced the accused’s sentence to five years. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
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